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Controlled Flexible Response is a nuclear deterrence
strategy that is being implemented as part of the United
State's deterrence strategy. That strategy is explored and
questions concerning its viability are discussed. The role
of options and the necessity of knowing the military's per-
ceptions and values concerning these options is discussed.
A quantitative methodology is developed to define the mili-
tary's position in regards to Controlled Flexible Response.
Variables are defined, quantified, and analyzed. The results
of the survey of the military's values and perceptions con-
cerning nuclear deterrence strategies are presented. These
results suggest other questions for investigation. Some of
the more interesting questions are discussed.
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I. THE SCHLESINGER STRATEGY
A. THE DEBATE
In February of 1974 James R. Schlesinger, the Secretary
of Defense, purposely initiated a 'serious national debate 1
on the viability of the United States' reliance on a nuclear
deterrence strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
.
(50:261) He pointed out that while Assured Destruction re-
mains an option, revisions were being made toward the assign-
ment of nuclear assets to military targets instead of cities.
Schlesinger maintains that this shift ensures the flexibility
and selectivity to respond to a broad spectrum of risks. (50:21)
Clear discussion of the subject of nuclear deterrence requires
a definition of terms. The definitions in the following section
will be utilized throughout this paper.
B. THE LANGUAGE OF DETERRENCE
Like almost all areas of human endeavor the study of nuclear
deterrence strategies is based on a language, a knowledge of
which is fundamental to any understanding of the field. The
explanations and definitions offered here are not necessarily
sanctioned or accepted by any authoritative body other than
the author himself. It is fact that certain words or phrases
found in different articles or speeches have considerably
different meaning dependent upon the author and context.

1 . Counterforce
Counterforce does not yet appear in Webster's dic-
tionary. Counter as a combining prefix is defined by Webster
as denoting, among other things, the concept of opposition.
Thus, strictly speaking, counterforce should mean opposition
to force. In this case the force referred to is the strategic
nuclear force of a nation.
Counterforce in strategic jargon is sometimes equated
to "missile silo killing" (59:37) and is often associated
with what are known as war-fighting strategies. These are
strategies which envision nuclear exchanges, the purposes of
which are rather limited and calculated on a failure of
deterrence
.
Counterforce capability is defined by J. Coffey as
"The ability to destroy an enemy's strategic offensive forces '
through attacks on missiles and bombers before these can be
launched." (8:203)
2 . Countervalue
A redundant reference to Webster gives an intial
definition of countervalue as something that is in opposition
to value. This word definition produces a rather obtuse
concept of countervalue. It is generally taken in deterrence
literature to mean a strategy of attacking 'civilian' targets
such as population centers or industry. (8:203)
Most experts in the field indicate that countervalue
is the targeting philosophy associated with the strategy of

Mutual As.sured Destruction (MAD) . This is the holocaust
strategy designed to destroy the social and economic fiber
of a nation by destroying a major portion of the industrial
capacity and killing a large percentage of the population.
3. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
The above reference to countervalue as the targeting
philosophy of MAD introduces the reader to this deterrence
strategy v/hich embraces the most destructive form of war
ever known to man
.
The basic assumption of nuclear deterrence has been
that mutual self destruction is unacceptable. The first
corollary of this assumption is that it is no 'nukes' or
all 'nukes'. The second corollary is that destruction of
one's opponent is feasible if unacceptable destruction in
kind can be CERTAINLY avoided.
Corollary (1) has achieved the status of international
law. Breakage of this covenant would have serious internal
and international consequences (politically, economically,
etc. ) .
Corollary (2) is the basis of the U.S. second strike
philosophy. That is, as long as there are sufficient sur-
vivable forces, MAD is viable and thus deterrence is operable.
MAD says that if the enemy crosses some rather well-
defined line he will be destroyed. It is clear, unequivocal,
and not subject to misinterpretation. As long as the lines
not to be crossed are clearly drawn MAD is not vulnerable to

probing or testing. Its effectiveness is based on the
willingness of a nation to use force and the clear under-
standing by a potential aggressor of that willingness.
(37:105)
MAD assumes that this gross destruction will be
mutual. This is no war-fighting or war-winning strategy but
rather a strategy of deterrence based on terror. The cham-
pions of MAD subsume that no rational process will result
in nuclear war because it assures self-destruction. Clearly
neither side will emerge with an 'edge' or 'victorious' or
'ahead' in any sense now known.
From the United State's point of view MAD says we
will never strike first, so if the Soviet Union were to launch
an all-out attack and devastate America our second strike
forces could return in kind the same sort of devastation upon
the Soviet Union.
4 . Mutual Assured Survival
This rather new concept is less well understood but
appears to be connected with the strategy of flexible response,
As the words state, this is a strategy of mutual restraint
where two powers engage in delicate nuclear exchanges tar-
geted against selected high-value targets which may be
strategic forces (counterforce) , transportation assets,
power-generating stations or other strategic assets without
deliberately inflicting 'unacceptable' casualties. It is a
-—
J
strategy of hurt with less pain, requiring the nicest sense
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of honor b.etween nations engaged in a nuclear war. MAS
assumes both sides have a high regard for human life. If
we must have a destructive war, let's destroy the things men
build and not the men who build them. This is a war-fighting
strategy.
5 . Controlled Flexible Response
Controlled Flexible Response (CFR) in today's context
refers wholly to nuclear responses and thus must be carefully
distinguished from the arguments of the late fifties and
early sixties when it meant the flexibility to respond in
some manner other than nuclear to a non-nuclear provocation.
It was an argument for balanced forces including sizable
conventional forces.
Controlled flexible response is a philosophy as well
as a strategy. It has the breadth to encompass MAD, MAS, or
any other deterrence strategy depending upon the degree of
control and/or flexibility exercised. In itself then, con-
trolled flexible response has little meaning. Only when it
is coupled to the pre-conflict declarations of a nation does
it take form and then only if these declarations have been
conclusive enough to indicate the probable courses of action
.
I
a nation would take given certain provocations.
Most generally, controlled flexible response is
linked to MAS as a means of providing a limited nuclear
response to a limited first strike. What is not clearly
stated is if the response be equal, somewhat less, or of some
11

multiple of the initial limited strike. Crises decisions
would be forced upon the nation attacked to determine a
suitable response to some unforeseen attack in a relatively
short time span. Controlled flexible response is thus a
philosophy which can have ambiguities for both the aggressor
and the victim.
This list of definitions is no way inclusive. Many
other concepts such as the Dulles Doctrine, Trip Wires, Shield
Strategy and Witholding strategies exist. These issues are
not directly dealt with in this paper and are thus not inclu-
ded. If the reader is interested, numerous books from the
bibliography are fine sources of explanation of the whole
modern (post 1945) history of deterrence. One of the latest
and easiest readings i£ George Quester's book Nuclear Diplo-
macy (34) .
Appendix A is a tabulation of the U.S. and USSR
strategic forces made by the author utilizing numerous un-
classified sources and conducting some simple calculations
using figures from different sources. This appendix will
give the reader an appreciation for the magnitude of forces
available as instruments to operationalize various deterrence
strategies
.
C. CONTROLLED FLEXIBLE RESPONSE (CFR)
In 1961 the first indications that strategic nuclear
deterrence thought had begun to embrace the realities of a
changed international power balance appeared. The U.S. was
12

(or was very soon to be) no longer the one predominate nuclear
power. Because of the Soviet drive to parity (if not super-
iority) it became infeasible for the United States to maintain
a strategy based on vast nuclear superiority. This situation
led to the development of strategic options other than Assured
Destruction which had previously sufficed as the deterrence
strategy. Secretary Schlesinger said that in 1961 we "....
undertook the retargeting necessary...." to adopt aspects of
damage limiting and counterforce options. (42:36)
The ratification of the ABM treaty in 19 72 has removed
damage limiting as a serious strategic option. What remained
was the strategy of MAD with some vague counterforce options.
Secretary Schlesinger has announced "
. . . . that the Penta-
gon has started to modify the philosophy that has dominated
strategic thinking since the McNamara years." (63:17)
Since we ourselves find it difficult to
believe that we could actually implement
the threat of assured destruction in
response to a limited attack on military
targets that caused relatively few civilian
casualties, there can be no certainty that,
in a crisis, prospective opponents would
be deterred from testing our resolve.
Allied concern about the credibility of
this particular threat has been evident
for more than a decade. In any event,
the actuality of such a response would
be utter folly except where our own or
allied cities were attacked. (42:37)
The Secretary argues that it is our own lack of resolve
which would induce an enemy to test our willingness to respond
massively to a limited attack. He does not indicate the
13

source for his statement concerning our difficulty in
implementing the threat of Assured Destruction.
Other considerations enter into Schlesinger 's rationale
for a Controlled Flexible Response Strategy. Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense Clements stated that he and Secretary Schles-
inger " . . . . consider the national policy on SALT pivots on
a formula of 'equal aggregates' .... this means that we match
to some extent, although not necessarily by the same means,
the counterforce capabilities of their (the Soviets) SS-9,
SS-18, and other new ICBMs . " (52) It might be said that
our deterrence strategy is somewhat dictated by Soviet advances
in weaponry.
Dr. Schlesinger told the Pentagon Press Corps "I would
not want the President (Nixon) or any future President of
the United States, to be in a position in which the Soviets
are in a unilateral position of striking U.S. military forces
/
with a degree of effectiveness which the Soviets do not per-
ceive we could achieve." He went on to say that strategic
equality is based on " . . . . maintaining a posture in which no
unilateral advantages in terms of strikes against military
targets without the necessity of striking cities on either
side would be obtained by a potential foe." (52)
The fear that a President might be in a position of
having U.S. military forces attacked but not U.S. cities and
not have the ability to reciprocate in kind appears to be at
the heart of the Secretary's strategy. Schlesinger has argued
14

that in this case the President, with his only option being
destruction of Soviet cities and the almost certain Soviet
second strike on U.S. cities, might decide to save American
lives by not retaliating, in effect acquiescing to the
aggression. (61)
Schlesinger is publicly acknowledging the credibility of
the Soviet second strike capability. This acknowledgement
is a crucial aspect of the changed power balance of the late
60 's. It was not until the late 60 's that the Soviets had
enough strategic assets at sea to have this Assured Destruc-
tion capability. We then entered into the field of Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD) . The doctrine of sufficiency vice
superiority is an expression of the acceptance of this reality
by the United States^.
D. TARGETING IMPLICATIONS OF CFR
Many persons argue that the development of CFR could mean
the development of a U.S. capability to neutralize the Soviet's
second strike capability rather than attack Soviet cities.
If the Soviet second strike capability is from land based
missiles, we have in fact created a first strike capability.
If the Soviet second strike capability is from submarine
based missiles, then the argument is bankrupt unless we go
all out on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) , something that
we agreed in SALT I not to do. ASW technology Is unable to
adequately ensure the detection, tracking, and elimination
of any significant, percentage of ballistic missile submarines
15

at sea before they launch their missiles, now or for the
foreseeable future. In any case, to pose a threat to the
second strike forces of the Soviets is generally acknowledged
to be inviting a preemptive attack on the basis that such a
vulnerable position would be intolerable to either the U.S.
or the USSR. What then are suitable counterforce targets?
Dr. Schlesinger has defined his view of counterforce
targets as military targets. What are military targets?
Can one target an Army, a mobile mechanized Army? The twenty
minute retargeting capability envisioned for the Command Data
Buffer System (CDBS) proposed to support CFR would require
real time accurate location information not readily available
for mobile targets, particularly in times of crises. Are
the targets then airfields, shipyards, supply dumps, and
transportation links? Can deterrence be built on the threatened
destruction of such commodities? The viability of targeting
Murmansk shipyards as a tit-for-tat target with say, Electric
Boat Company in Groton, Connecticut is central to this cal-
culus, including such factors as assets expended and the
possible uncertainty created. We are left then with military
targets almost surely meaning strategic nuclear forces, pri-
marily missile silos. Senator Stuart Symington most clearly
states that Secretary Schlesinger ' s strategy is switching
some targeting from cities to missile silos and he cautions
against the folly of imagining a surgical or clean (nuclear)
war. (49) Unless one shoots first the problem of shooting
at empty holes becomes a major consideration.
16

E. A SCENARIO FOR CFR
Dr. Schlesinger 's basic scenario is that the Soviets
believe that they have a force capable of destroying the U.S.
land-based missile force and do not believe we possess a
similar capability. The Soviets successfully launch a strike
against these targets (while retaining enough assets to
attack most major U.S. cities) and send an ultimatum that
the U.S. destroy all remaining nuclear arms. (56) Due to
the location of the U.S. missile assets civilian casualties
from the Soviet strike are 'minimal 1
.
Secretary Schlesinger argues that MAD is inhumane and
that the President might decide to save U.S. lives by not
retaliating if he had no other option than MAD, in effect
acquiescing to the. Soviets. Thomas Schelling states in his
book Arms And Influence that the " . . . . act of deterrence ....
depends upon the willingness to use force if deterrence fails."
- (37:43) This premise might be restated to read .... upon
an enemies perception of your willingness to use force.
Could the current shift in U.S. strategy be read in the
Kremlin as a lack of resolve to use force?
In this scenario the President could order our SLBM's
to destroy Soviet cities and population knowing that the
Soviets will retain enough assets to return in kind. What
does he do?
Secretary Schlesinger would provide him with the option
of responding by destroying the remaining Soviet nuclear forces
17

This assumes that they are targetable, that is land based
missiles and that we know which silos are empty.
Following this scenario, the U.S. would destroy the re-
maining Soviet land based missiles. What is the result? Two
opposing forces, both with MAD capabilities retained, at
least in their SLBM forces. By Schlesinger ' s accounting no
gain is accrued to either side thus you have effective de-
terrence. Why then has the Secretary challenged the nation
to a public debate on nuclear deterrence strategy?
F. THE RATIONALE FOR CFR
Secretary Schlesinger may be telling the Russians not
to become carried away with their recent advances in missile
technology, that there is no credible first strike scenario
for either side. It may be that by raising the possibility
of a U.S. first strike capability the Soviets will be en-
couraged to follow the foregoing scenario to a similar con-
clusion. It could be viewed as a device to educate the
Soviets in the limitations of their soon to be realized
increased strategic capabilities. That is, we have had a
first strike capability for a long time now and it has not
accrued us any great strategic or diplomatic advantages and
the same will be true for the Soviets.
The timing of these arguments in the open press should
not seem to be curious. With SALT negotiations in progress
the Soviets must be impressed with the lack of impressive-
ness that nuclear parity provides. Senator Proxmire has
18

cautioned the American people not to be overly alarmed by
certain of Dr. Schlesinger ' s arguments but to consider that
much of what he says is directed to the Soviets with the
psychological impact in mind. (58)
The essence of these arguments is captured in an exchange
between Secretary Schlesinger and Senator Brooke. According
to the Secretary, "The aim of this modification of policy
is to make lower-level nuclear conflicts as well as conflicts
involving large scale destruction of cities even less likely
than they are now, which is near zero." (50:21)
Senator Brooke responded that " . . . . the pursuit of options
you (Schlesinger) have outlined threatens strategic desta-
bilization without providing any meaningful advantage in
terms of deterrence.." (50:21)
Whither the military in this 'national debate 1 ? There
has been almost a complete silence on the part of the mili-
tary. Does this silence indicate approval or acquiescence?
Chapter Two investigates reasons for being concerned with
the military's position on nuclear deterrence strategy.
19

II. THE MILITARY AND CFR
A. ONE MILITARY ELITE'S VIEW OF CFR
The new strategy articulated by Dr. Schlesinger requires
a fine sense of judgment to evaluate an attack and to reply
in a manner the enemy will perceive to be non-escalative
and non-capitulatory in nature. These decisions made in a
crises atmosphere when time and human resolve are likely to
be in short supply can be viewed as the weak link in the
whole rationale of CFR.
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, USN (ret) was asked on September
6, 19 74 if he thought ".... that our government's decision
making process, particularly at the civilian-military inter-
face could support this (CFR) strategy?" Admiral Zumwalt
replied that he felt the probability of success was about
.00001 percent that the strategy could be supported. His
view was that the U.S. would wait to see if the attack was
accidental or premeditated. In the latter case our response
would be massive spasmodic retaliation. By massive retalia-
tion Admiral Zumwalt is taken to mean a full scale retaliation
utilizing the majority of the U.S. strategic assets against
a full range of pre-planned targets. The key here is the
reliance on pre-planned targets. There is no dependence on
possibly vulnerable communications links required to retarget
strategic assets or upon considered agreement between civilian
and military leaders as to what the targets should be.
20

Admiral Zuirrwalt, a military person who, until very re-
cently / was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thus pub-
licly implies a lack of confidence in at least one aspect
(decision making) of CFR.
There is a considerable body of opinion which holds that
a national policy for survival in a world of nuclear weapons
should enjoy the intellectual acceptance of the military
organization charged with the responsibility of carrying
the burden of operationalization of that policy. Military
strategists had warned that the U.S. should not become in-
volved in a land war on the Asian continent. (51:26) It
took a Viet Nam for the civilian leadership to fully appre-
caite that dictum. Academic options must be militarily
viable. Otherwise/ if an attempt is made to exercise the
option (their mere existence argues for their application)
the results could be militarily disastrous.
B. OPTIONS AND ACTIONS
Graham Allison has argued that the presence or absence
of ready military options may affect the decisions about the
use of force.
Capabilities created to increase governments
options by generating information and alter-
natives that would otherwise be unavailable,
creates interests in, and often lobbies for,
the use of these capabilities. The creation
of a capability brings with it officials
commissioned to search for instances in which
that capability might be appropriately used,
a flow of information about such problems and
their solutions, and groups with interests in
the exercise of that capability. Such factors
21

tend to change other government officials
'
awareness of, attention to, and judgments
about the use of that capability. (51:24)
The existence of a capability can affect a politician's
interpretations of national interests, commitments and defense
policies without regard for the full millitary implications
of the decisions based on those interpretations. (51:24)
"The availability of a ready military option has been one
major factor in U.S. decisions about the use of force ...."
(51:31) President Eisenhower's decision to not intervene
in Southeast Asia when the French were in danger of defeat
can be traced to a distinct lack of capability at that time.
(51:27)
In the case of CFR, this option is a product not of the
military's invention. However, the military has not publicly
resisted creation of the option, in fact the military- indus-
trial complex may well become involved in the operationalization
of CFR and develop those interests and pressures which could
possibly obscure more elemental military reservations about
the effectiveness of CFR.
One may well ask does the U.S. military, at this early
stage, support the CFR option as a useful and necessary part
of our nuclear deterrence strategy? If not, and it does
become a fixture of our deterrence strategy, will there be
pressures for its employment and what are the likely military
results of such employment? The latter question should be
answered in the context of the military position prior to
22

the ordered implementation of CFR and the developed adherence
which will then occur. This paper is concerned only with
answering the first question concerning the military's
intellectual support or lack thereof for the strategy of
CFR.
C. DEFINING THE MILITARY POSITION
We have previously summarized the major points of Secre-
tary Schlesinger 's strategy for nuclear deterrence, the next
task is to make a determination of the values and perceptions
of the U.S. military concerning nuclear deterrence strategies,
The accomplishment of this task has been through the conduct
of a survey of a sample of military persons.
The intent of the survey is to cover military officers
who meet the following criteria:
1. Career Officers
2. Rank between 0-4 and 0-6 (Major/Lieutenant Commander
and Colonel/Captain)
3. Likely to succeed to higher levels of command and
responsibility
Criteria One is adopted to reflect the views of persons
committed to a military career as opposed to those who might
be serving in the military for an abbreviated period of time.
Criteria Two strives to ensure that the respondents have
sufficient service time to adequately reflect a mature and
knowledgable military view. Criteria Three is selected in
order that the survey results will reflect the values and
perceptions of a segment of the military who, in the near
23

future will probably be in higher command and advisory
positions within the military community and possibly at
various civilian interface positions.
The author felt that these criteria could best be ful-
filled if the survey were conducted at the Army, Navy, and
Air Force War Colleges. The Navy War College at Newport,
Rhode Island and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania responded in a receptive manner and provided
complete assistance in the conduct of the survey. The Air
War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Georgia asked for
changes in the survey content which would have destroyed the
validity of combining responses from this source with those
from the other sources. Time constraints forced an abandon-
ment of the goal of conducting the survey at the Air War
College. This gap was filled through the Cooperation of the
Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California.
The Air Force Officers at DLI, both staff and students, were
asked to complete the survey. The three aforementioned cri-
teria are probably met by these Air Force Officers, however
they cannot be said, with the same degree of certainty, to
be a population with the same selection criteria as those
found at the War Colleges
.
D. WHO ARE THE RESPONDENTS
Tables 2-1 through 2-5 are a gross profile of the persons
responding to the survey. The majority of the respondents
were from the Army War College (AWC) . (See Table 2-1.) This
24

is attributed to the method of distribution there which
differed from the Navy War College (NWC) distribution in
that the survey had a cover letter which indicated the
official approval of the AWC for the conduct of the survey
and encouraged, but did not require response. Also, return
to a senior staff member's mail box was requested. At the
NWC the survey was conducted less formally and response was
somewhat disappointing. An official cover letter was also
utilized on the surveys distributed at DLL The high percen-
tage of responses there speaks to the effectiveness of this
technique.
Source Frequency Rel . Percent Cum. Percent
AWC 82 59.4 59.4
NWC 32 23.2 82.6
DLI 24 17.4 100.0
138 100.0 100.0



























TABLE 2-2 Respondents by Rank
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Service Frequency Rel. Percent Cum. Percent
USMC 7 5.1 5.1
USA 82 59.4 64.5
USAF 31 22.5 87.0
USN 15 10.9 97.8
Civ 3 2.2 100.0
138 100.0 100.0
TABLE 2-3 Respondents by Service
Warfare
Specialty Frequency Rel. Percent Cum. Percent
Infantry 27 19.6 20.1
Staff 37 26.8 47.8
Strategic 1 .7 48.5
Armor 2 1.4 50.0
FLD Art 20 14 .5 64.9
TAC Air 31 22.5 88.1
SAC 6 4.3 92.5
SWO 7 5.1 97.8
Other 3 2.2 100.0
None 4 2.9 100.0
138 100.0 100.0



























TABLE 2-5 Respondents by Age

The rank profile (Table 2-2) results in a high degree
of confidence that criteria one and two have been satisfied.
The major number of respondents fell in the 0-5 and 0-6 rank
categories. The service profile (Table 2-3) indicates the
Army to be more likely to fill out a survey regardless of
source, i.e., AWC or NWC . Table 2-4 is somewhat disappointing
The author had hoped for a greater representation of Surface
Warfare Officers (SWO) . Also, it was not anticipated that
27% of the respondents would represent staff type officers.
If it is to be assumed that most operational commanders rely
on their staff corps officers when making operational deci-
sions then this figure becomes less disturbing. Table 2-5
indicates that the respondents are mostly in an age bracket
where they can be considered to have many years of active
service ahead of them, thus reinforcing the satisfaction of
criteria three.
E. WHITHER THE MILITARY
It has been demonstrated that at least one military elite
is unable to accept the tenants of CFR. Does this attitude
prevail throughout the military community? The survey of
individuals profiled in the previous section is intended to
answer this question. It is important to fill this apparent
gap in our knowledge. The dangers of options and actions
expressed by Graham Allison and reservations voiced by others
can better be evaluated if the military view of CFR is known.
27

If war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means then
experts from that arm of diplomacy must be heard, before the
means are used unwisely.
28

III. VARIABLE DEFINITION AND OPERATIONAL! ZATION
A. THE SURVEY APPROACH
Chapter One contains the essense of a dramatic shift in
the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy. Chapter Two raises the
question of whether this shift enjoys the support of the
United States military community and certain questions con-
cerning the effects of a congruency or lack thereof between
civilian policy makers and the military community. Chapter
Three will be concerned with variable definition and opera-
tionalization of concepts which are intended to be indicators
of the military's values and perceptions concerning nuclear
deterrence strategies.
The determination of these values and perceptions could
be attempted in various ways. For this study a survey was
chosen as a simple and direct measure of the concepts in
question. The prime value of the survey technique is the
confidentiality of the responses, even to the researcher and
the complete anonymity of the respondents . Appendix B is
the survey as it was distributed.
The survey questions were developed primarily to test
the hypothesis 'the U.S. military supports the nuclear
deterrence strategy of Controlled Flexible Response. 1
Most questions are drawn from statements of Secretary
Schlesinger on his concept of deterrence. This is an attempt





The importance of defining the military's perception of
nuclear deterrence strategies has been discussed. Of equal
importance is the methodology used to arrive at that defini-
tion in order that it might be said to be accurate and valid.
A pitfall to be avoided is the normative approach that says
what the military's strategic concepts are and then sets out
to prove it so. This study is an attempt to empirically des-
cribe what is . This methodological tool can then be used to
test theoretical statements (hypothesis) and in the process
pave the way for the postulation of new hypotheses
.
The data collected for the purpose of this study is
viewed as aggregate data. Each variable is based on summed
values and therefore they may be termed summation variables.
The value of each variable is the sum of the 138 cases for
which data was collected.
C. VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION
Operationalization of the hypothesis could have been as
simple as to ask each respondent "Do you support the deterrence
strategy of CFR?" This would presuppose the subject was
familiar with the primary elements of the strategy. To more
fully test the hypothesis, the concept of support or non-
support of CFR was operationalized by defining five simple
scenarios in pictoral form and asking questions of an indi-
vidual as to his reactions to the strategies depicted. Other




statements and are utilized as multiple indicators. These
multiple indicators serve as a check on the consistency of
any one set of responses.
The dependent variable is thus a measure of the degree
of support for CFR within the military community. This is
the object of explanation. The null hypothesis (Ho) is,
"The military does not support the CFR strategy." Twenty
variables are used to explain the dependent variable. The
advantages of these multiple streams of evidence are described
by Gurr as " . . . . a decision to treat a theoretical dimension
in as many theoretical ways as feasible." (17:31) This
technique is sometimes referred to as 'multiple operationism'
.
Aggregate variables are formed from these 'multiple streams'
to determine a sense of agreement or lack thereof with CFR.
D. SELECTION OF CASES
Chapter Two sketched a profile of the respondents and
the reasons for surveying these persons. It is not put forth,
that this sampling represents the whole military community.
In fact, that is not the intent at all. The cases are meant
to represent the middle to upper-middle level elites of the
officer corps. This is the only meaning implied throughout
this study when the term 'the military' is used. What Gurr
terms a "stratified random sample" (17:42) is the goal.
Stratification is aimed for by the implications of the
selection process by which the persons surveyed happened to
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arrive at the institutions where the survey was conducted.
Randomness is achieved through the whim which moves one
person to respond and another to cache the survey in a
circular file.
E. DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES
The following is a list of the primary variables (those
appearing on the survey) with an explanation of the concepts




VARO 6 - B;s reaction to A;s limited strike in Scenario
I is likely to deter such a strike by A.
A YES answer to VAR00 6 indicates the respondent believes
massive retaliation deters limited nuclear strikes.
VARO 7 - Scenario I almost certainly leads to Scenario
II.
A YES response to VAR00 7 indicates the respondents accep-
tance of the limitations of massive retaliation with regards
to the sanctity of his nation. He accepts the second strike
capability of the enemy and their willingness to use it.
VARO 8 - The exchange depicted in Scenario III will deter
A from initiating such an exchange.
A positive response to VAR008 indicates the respondents
acceptance of CFR as a viable deterrent strategy with regards
to deterrence of limited strikes.
VARO 09 - Scenario V is the most probable format for any
future exchange as long as A and B are of comparable strength
32

1. Limited strike by A.
2. Massive retaliation by B.
SCENARIO II
A
1. Limited strike by A.
2. Massive retaliation by B.







1. Limited strike by A.







1. Massive first strike by A.
2. through n. Controlled response
by B.
1. Massive first strike by A.
2. Massive second strike by B.
Figure 3-1. Nuclear Exchange Scenarios
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A YES answer indicates the respondents commitment to
the traditional view of nuclear warfare as massive and
spasmodic.
VAROiO - B's best strategy to deter a limited first
strike by A is Scenario I or Scenario III.
A direct question of whether the respondent favors the
massive retaliation of Scenario I or the controlled response
of Scenario III to deter a limited strike scenario.
VAR011 - The deployment of a 100% effective counterforce
capability against land based strategic forces by A or B
would significantly alter the strategic balance.
The restriction of this question to land based strategic
forces implies acceptance of the curreny day invulnerability
of SLBM's (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile). This ques-
tion intends to test one aspect of congruency between the
military and Dr. Schlesinger. "We would not desire to be in
a position of inferiority with regard to the ability to in-
flict major damage on the military components of another
state relative to the damage that the other state might be
able to inflict on the military components we possess." (52)
VAR012 - The espousal by B of the strategy depicted in
Scenario III a) increases international stability b) decreases
international stability.
This question measures the respondents strength of commit-
ment towards CFR as a viable nuclear deterrence strategy.
Secretary Schlesinger and various congressmen have had a
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running dialogue on this very question. (50:261) (See pages
7-19 of this paper.)
VARO 1
3
- The aftermath of Scenario V assures its
non-occurrence
.
An affirmative response indicates acceptance of the MAD
theory of retaliation to deter a massive first strike by
an enemy
.
VARO 14 - The deployment of an apparently effective
counterforce capability by either party forces a like
deployment by the other.
The question is linked to VAR011. Schlesinger calls for
U.S. and Soviet strategies forces with equal capabilities,
sometimes termed sufficiency or 'equal aggregates'. A posi-
tive response indicates a view similar to that held by
Secretary Schlesinger.
VARO 15 - Assuming that B possesses no other reaction
capability than that depicted in Scenario I and B knew for
certain that the result of his reaction in Scenario I will
be Scenario II his rational options to a limited strike by
A include no response.
Schlesinger has postulated that a U.S. President could
be put in this position. He has said that CFR is needed to
give the President other options besides massive retaliation
or no retaliation. (61:9) A positive response indicates
agreement with the postulation of a no response option.
VARO 16 - The assumed position of B in the preceeding
question reduces A's perception of the nuclear threshold.
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This question probes the respondents concepts of the
effect of a one reaction strategy (MAD) on a prospective
aggressor's perception of the nuclear threshold. In other
words, would the aggressor feel more inclined to 'chip away 1
at the U.S. if the U.S. had only a MAD strategy of massive
spasmodic retaliation for any attack?
VARO 1
7
- Scenario III will probably result in continued
probes and responses by both sides.
This question indicates the respondents feelings towards
the possibility of a low level nuclear conflict being contained,
VARO 1
8
- The response of B in Scenario V is a stronger
deterrent to a massive attack by A than B's response in
Scenario IV.
A positive answer indicates the respondents preference
for MAD over CFR to deter a limited attack.
VARO 19 - B's best strategy to deter a limited strike
by A is:
a. Response in kind.
b. Response at some multiple of A's strike.
c. All out attack upon A.
A direct indicator of the respondents preferred strategy
of response to a limited strike. The response (a) would be
in agreement with Secretary Schlesinger ' s strategy.
VARO 2 and VARO 21 demonstrate the author's ineptness
in social research. The original intent has been lost and
they are not considered in the analysis of the survey.
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VAR0 22 - The best strategy to deter a limited first
strike against one's strategic forces is:
a. Instant Massive Retaliation
b. Selected Controlled Response
Another direct measure of the respondents perception of
the 'best' strategy to deter a limited first strike.
VARO 2
3
- The possession of sufficient survivable second
strike forces neutralizes the effect of an enemies deployment
of an effective anti-land based ICBM counter force capability
and argues against the necessity to deploy a like capability.
This question is an attempt to deal with Schlesinger '
s
philosophy of 'equal aggregates'. Must the U.S. match every
Soviet capability for no other reason than to maintain 'equal
aggregates' whether or not it serves our deterrent strategy?
A positive response indicates a position which is not in
agreement with the Secretary of Defense.
VARO 2
4
- If the limited strike by A in Scenario II were
not responded to more limited strikes would follow.
Another attempt to illuminate the respondents view of
nuclear deterrence under CFR. A positive response would
indicate disagreement with the philosophy " . . . . the Presi-
dent might decide to save American lives by not retaliating...."
since other strikes would follow.
VARO 2
5
- A shift in deterrence strategy form massive
retaliation to controlled response increases the likelihood
of a nuclear exchange.
37

Is CFR destabilizing as Senator Brooke and others have
charged? A negative response indicates acceptance of the
Schlesinger philosophy.
F. PREPARATION FOR ANALYSIS
The data collected was transferred from the survey forms
onto standard eighty column coding forms. The raw data was
then keypunched onto IBM punch cards. This deck of cards
comprises the data base for this study.
Table 3-1 is an example of the precoded data base format.
In the example respondent 001 is definitely a pro-MAD respon-
dent. Referring to Section E of this chapter it can be seen
that he answers consistently in the pro-MAD or support for
Ho manner. Respondent 002 is an example of a pro-CFR respon-
dent. Following the explanations offered in the previous
chapter he can be seen to be opposing Ho and supporting CFR.
Respondent 003 is somewhat ambivalent. His answers do not
show the same consistency of support or non-support for Ho
that respondents 001 and 002 demonstrate.
Analysis of the data was conducted through the use of a
computer program known as Statistical Package For The Social
Sciences (SPSS) . SPSS is a relatively simple program designed
to perform many useful applications in the analysis of social
science data. It was developed by social scientists at
Stanford University. The SPSS program is particularly
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The raw responses were coded in an alpha-numeric manner.
For the purposes of data reduction and analysis it was neces-
sary to recode the data into wholly numeric terms. This
step caused the researcher great pains and considerable hours
were spent in the computer center smoothing the data into a
form the computer would handle cleanly.
G. DEFINITION OF AGGREGATE VARIABLES
Five aggregate variables were created from the twenty
primary variables. One variable (VAR654) was created in a
strict empirical manner. VAR654 (con CFR) is an attempt to
measure the military's acceptance or rejection of the strategy
of Controlled Flexible Response.
A search for significant correlations was conducted
using the criteria of .05 significance for bivariate relation-
ships under the CROSSTABS routine of SPSS and .001 for signi-
ficance of Spearman Correlations obtained from the NON-PARAMETRIC
correlation routine. The screening process is graphically
represented in Figure 3-1.
The variables screened were aggregated to form VAR654.
High scores indicate a rejection of the CFR strategy. VAR654

































Figure 3-1. Summary of the Inductive Screening
of the primary variables
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VARIABLE SCORE 2 SCORE 1
VAR00 6 YES NO








VARO 22 A B







Maximum Possible Score - 26
Minimum Possible Score - 13
The other four variables (VARlll, VAR222, VAR333 7 and
VAR444) are aggregates based on an intuitive sense of the
purpose of the primary variables (VARO 06 through VAR02 5)
.
Primary variables were deductively grouped where they
indicated an acceptance or rejection of a common principle
inherent in the CFR strategy.
The common principles for these aggregate variables are:
VARlll (PRO MAD) - A high score indicates an acceptance
of MAD as a preferable deterrence strategy over CFR. VARlll
is an aggregate of:
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VARIABLE SCORE 2 SCORE 1
VAR0 06 YES NO







VAR02 5 YES NO
Maximum Possible Score - 18
Minimum Possible Score - 9
VAR222 (CFR DESTAB) - A high score indicates a sense of
agreement with the notion that CFR is somehow destabilizing
or induces a lowering of the tolerance to use nuclear weapons
CFR is conducive to making nuclear war more likely. VAR222
is an aggregation of:
VARIABLE SCORE 2 SCORE 1
VAR012 B A
VAR017 YES NO
VAR02 5 • YES NO
Maximum Possible Score - 6
Minimum Possible Score - 3
VAR333 (EQUAL AGGS) - VAR333 is an attempt to measure the
amount of agreement within the military for the philosophy of
'equal aggregates.' Should the U.S. match the USSR in all
capabilities or should we define our own needs and maximize
those. A high score indicates acceptance of the concept of
'equal aggregates.' VAR333 is an aggregate of:
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VARIABLE SCORE 2 SCORE 1
VAR111 YES NO
VAR014 YES NO
VAR02 3 NO YES
Maximum Score Possible - 6
Minimum Score Possible - 3
VAR444(PRO CFR) - Measures a general sense of agreement
or disagreement with the various philosophies of Secretary
Schlesinger which make up his strategy of Controlled Flexible
Response. A high score indicates a sense of congruency
between the respondent and Dr. Schlesinger. VAR444 is an
aggregate of:
VARIABLE SCORE 1 SCORE 2
VAR00 6 NO YES








VAR019 A B OR C
VAR0 22 B A
VAR0 23 NO YES
VAR02 4 NO YES
VAR0 25 NO YES
Maximum Score Possible - 28
Minimum Score Possible - 14
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The data results presented in the following chapter are
built upon an examination of the responses to the twenty
primary variables (VAR006 through VAR025) , the empirical
aggregate variable (VAR654) , and the intuitive aggregate
variables (VAR111, VAR222, VAR333, andVAR444).
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IV. DATA TABULATION AND PRESENTATION
A. METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to present the data results
for the eventual purpose of determining if the aggregate
variables support or deny the null hypothesis. Figure 4-1
indicates the reduction of the primary variables through two
methodologies, one inductive, the other deductive. The aggre-
gate variables thus created can then be analyzed to determine
their support of the null hypothesis. The ideal resultant
would be to have all five of the aggregate variables point
in the same direction, either support or non-support multiple
streams of evidence would be thus available which would
fortify any conclusions which would be drawn from this study.
The aggregate variables will be described in terms of
gross frequency of responses and by cross-tabulation with







4. Source (AWC, NWC, DLI)
5. Age
Table 4-1 is a gross representation of the distribution
characteristics of the responses to the primary variables.
The reader may find it convenient to refer to Table 4-1 when




























































Responses to Primary Variables
YES NO NUMBER OF CASES
VARIABLE SCORE 2 SCORE 1 WITH MISSING VALUES MEAN
006 118(85.5) 20(14.5) 1.855
007 114(82.6) 24(17.4) 1.826
008 32(23.2) 105(76.1) 1.234
009 81(58.7) 57(41.8) 1.587
010 1-116(84.1) III20 (14.5)
*
2 1.853
Oil 104(75.4) 32(23.2) 2 1.765
012 A-63(45.7) B-72 (52.2)* 3 1.467
013 50(36.2) 87(63.0) 1 1.365
014 116(84.1) 22(15.9) 1.841
015 88(63.8) 47(34.1) 3 1.652
016 82(59.4) 48(34.8) 8 1.631
017 102(73.9) 31(22.5) 5 1.767
018 123(89.1) 13(9.4) 2 1.904
019 A-17(12.3) B-36(26.1) C--82(59 .4) 3 1.519
020 .25
021 .50
022 97(70.3) 37(26.8) 4 1.725
023 58(42.0) 74(53.6) 6 1.439
024 97(70.3) 33(23.9) 8 1.746
025 100 (72.5) 35(25.4) 3 1.741
*Score: VAR011 1=1, 111=2, VAR012 A=l, B=2 , VAR019 A=1,B=2,C=3
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TABLE 4-2. Aggregate Variables: Sense, Range, and Cutoff Values
SENSE MAXIMUM ACTUAL
VARIABLE (SUPPORT Ho) POSSIBLE RANGE RANGE CUTOFF
VAR111 HIGH SCORE 9-18 10-18 14-18
VAR222 HIGH SCORE 3-6 3-6 5-6
VAR333 LOW SCORE 3-6 3-6 3-4
VAR4 44 LOW SCORE 14-28 14-23 14-20
VAR654 HIGH SCORE 13-26 15-25 20-25
Table 4-2 indicates the 'sense' of the aggregate variables
and the cutoff values utilized. The term 'sense' refers to
the significance placed on a low or high value. (Example:
VAR654, high score indicates support for Ho.)
Cutoff values were determined by dividing the maximum
possible response scale at the midpoint. The values in Tables
4-8 through 4-10 represents those respondents whose aggregate
score falls at the end of the scale which indicates support
for Ho.
Tables 4-3 through 4-7 summarize the frequency distribu-
tion of the aggregate variables. Inspection of these tables
reveals the uneven distribution of responses over the actual
range of values of the aggregate variables. With the exception
of VAR3 33 the aggregate scores are skewed in the direction
which indicates a sense of disagreement with the strategy of
CFR or support for the null hypothesis.
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TABLE 4-3. Frequency Distribution of VAR654 (CON CFR)
Scores. High Score Indicates Support For Ho
ABSOLUTE RELATIVE CUMULATIVE
SCORE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
13 0.0 0.0
14 0.0 0.0
15 2 1.7 1.7
16 2 1.7 3.3
17 8 6.6 9.9
18 5 4.1 14.0
19 15 12.4 26.4
20 14 11.6 38.0
21 16 13.2 51.2
22 13 10.7 62.0
23 19 15.7 77.7
24 18 14.9 92.6
25 9 7.4 100.0
_26 0.0 100.0
TOTAL 121 100.0 100.0
Table 4-3 responses are skewed towards the higher scores.
73.6 percent of the 121 respondents aggregated to form VAR654
scored twenty or higher. Less than ten percent of the





' Frequency Distribution of VAR111 (PRO MAD)
Scores. High Score Indicates Support For Ho
ABSOLUTE RELATIVE CUMULATIVE
SCORE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
10 2 1.8 1.8
11 2 1.8 3.6
12 5 4.5 8.0
13 6 5.4 13.4
14 9 8.0 21.4
15 18 16.1 37.5
16 26 23.2 60.7
17 31 27.7 88.4
18 13 11.6 100.0
TOTAL 112 100.0 100.0
Table 4-4 indicates that 86.6 percent of the 112
respondents scored 14 or higher on a possible response scale
of 10 to 18.
TABLE 4-5. Frequency Distribution of VAR222 (CFR DESTAB)
Scores. High Score Indicates Support For Ho.
ABSOLUTE RELATIVE CUMULATIVE
SCORE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
3 8 6.2 6.2
4 27 20.9 27.1
5 44 34.1 61.2
6 50 38.8 100.0
TOTAL 129 100.0 100.0
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Table 4-5 represents the pattern of the 129 respondents
whose responses were aggregated to form VAR222 (CFR DESTAB)
,
72.9 percent scored 5 or 6 indicating support for Ho. Only
6.2 percent of the respondents scored 3, indicating that
they think CFR is a stabilizing option.
TABLE 4-6. Frequency Distribution of VAR333 (EQUAL AGGS)
Scores. Low Score Indicates Support For Ho.
ABSOLUTE RELATIVE CUMULATIVE
SCORE FREQUENCY FREQUENCY FREQUENCY
3 6 4.6 4.6
4 22 16.8 21.4
5 47 35.9 57.3
6 56 42.7 100.0
TOTAL 131 100.0 100.0
Table 4-6 describes the response pattern of the 131
respondents whose responses were aggregated to form VAR333
(EQUAL AGGS). 21.4 percent of the respondents scored 3 or
4 indicating support for Ho. 42.7 percent of the respondents
scored the maximum of 6, indicating non-support of Ho.
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TABLE 4-7. Frequency Distribution of VAR444 (PRO CFR)








14 2 1.7 1.7
15 13 11.0 12.7
16 21 17.8 30.5
17 28 23.8 54.2
18 20 16.9 71.2
19 12 10.2 81.4
20 10 8.5 89.8
21 5 4.2 94.1
22 5 4.2 98.3






TOTAL 118 100.0 100.0
Table 4-7 describes the response pattern of the 118
respondents whose responses have been aggregated to form
VAR444 (PRO CFR). A high score is a PRO CFR score. A low
score supports Ho. 89.8 percent of the respondents scored
20 or less. No respondents scored in the 24 to 28 range.
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Tables 4-8 through 4-10 summarizes the aggregate variable
response cross-tabulation with the five descriptive variables
for those respondents in the previously described cutoff
range. The skewness noted in the discussions of Tables 4-3
through 4-7 is mirrored across the range of respondent
descriptives.
The first two columns of Table 4-8 (VARlll) will be
explained. The other variables through Table 4-10 follow the
same format. Column one of Table 4-8 under VARlll is labeled
CUTOFF/TOTAL. This represents the number of respondents in
each category whose response fell in the cutoff range over
the total number of respondents in that category included
in the makeup of VARlll. 7/8 indicates that 7 LT/CPT rank
respondents were in the cutoff range and that there were 8
LT/CPT respondents included in the makeup of VARlll. 7/8
is then expressed in percentage form, 87.5. The totals at
the bottom of the columns are 88/112 and 78.6. 88/112 means
that 8 8 respondents were in the cutoff range out of a total
of 112 respondents whose responses makeup VARlll. This ratio
is then expressed as a percentage, 78.6. A logical question
at this point concerns the validity of these results.
B. VALIDITY CONSIDERATIONS
Validity is the most important criterion to be met in
quantitative research. The value of the research is depen-
dent upon the correspondence of the indicators to the
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The validity of the twenty primary variables is theoreti-
cal. The face validity of these variables is based on the
explanation of the purpose of each variable, substantiated
in many cases by direct quotes from the public statements of
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, discussed in the
previous chapter. It should be recognized that these primary
variables are intended to be indicators of the dependent
variable. The dependent variable is an estimation of the
military's support or lack of support for the strategy of
CFR.
The case for the face validity of the primary variables
rests to a large degree upon substantiating that they are
derived directly from the public statements of the Secretary
of Defense concerning key aspects of his CFR strategy.
Empirical validity is enhanced by close attention to
application of proven statistical methods. Adherence to the
analysis techniques explained by Gurr (17) and Babbie (1)
,
kept the author from committing gross empirical errors which
could cloud the validity of the results.
The empirical validity of VAR654 (CON CFR) is borne out
by the screening process (Figure 3-2) used to select the
primary components of the aggregate variables. These primary
components of VAR65 4 are more strongly correlated with one
another than with any others. The web of inter-relationships
is emphasized by Table 4-11. This table represents all the
correlations of the primary variables selected to form VAR654
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inclusion in VAR654. Only VAR014 and VAR023 stand out as not
being integrated into this web of inter-relationships. VAR018
has but one link, however that link is with VAR02 2 which is
thickly woven into the web.
TABLE 4-12. Comparison of Primary Variables Selected




VAR654VAR111 VAR2 22 VAR333 VAR4 4 4
(PRO MAD) (CFR DESTAB) (EQ AGGS) (PRO CFR) (CON CFR)
006 X X X
007
008 X X X
009 X
010 X X VMi,
011 X X
012 X X X X
013 X
014 X X
015 X X X
016
017 X X
018 X X X
019 X X X
020
021
022 X X X
023 X X X
024 X X
025 X X X X
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Table 4-12 emphasizes the relationship between variables
selected inductively and deductively for aggregation. Varia-
bles 007, 016, 020 and 021 were chosen by neither process
for inclusion. Only VAR009 was chosen inductively and not
utilized in any of the deductive aggregations. VAR013 and
VAR017 were chosen for deductive but not inductive aggregations
The strong cross bonds of correlation between the various
primary variables inductively selected to form VAR654 and
the selection of all but one of these variables (VAR009)
for inclusion in one or more of the deductively formed
aggregate variables enforces the validity of the aggregate
variables in fact representing that which the researcher
asserts they represent.
C. RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
One major criterion of reliability is replicability
.
This survey is easily duplicated. Use of a standardized
computer program (SPSS) and the application of its statisti-
cal tools would present no serious problems to someone
attempting to replicate this project.
Verification of the results could be accomplished by
various means. The null hypothesis could be tested through
interviews, the use of the delphi technique or through
imaginative definition and selection of other indicators.
Comparibility would be valid if the sampling technique
was shown to reflect essentially the same community as that
striven for in this survey.
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The reliability of the survey results could be verified
and/or improved through increase of the sample size. Once
again though, the sampling techniques must tap the same
community in order to ensure validity.
Replication utilizing a greater sample size is viewed
by the author as the most valid means of verification of
the reliability of the results of this survey. The primary
appeal of the survey technique is that anonymity is assured,
Other techniques could hold lesser assurances of anonymity
and induce some coloring of the results.
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. ANALYSIS OF THE INDUCTIVE APPROACH
The inductive process of reducing the primary variables
resulted in the creation of VAR6 54 (CON CFR) as an indicator
of the respondents support for the null hypothesis. Table
4-3 demonstrates the concentration of responses towards the
end of the scale indicating support for Ho. 73.5 percent
of the respondents scored 20 or higher on a scale of 13 to
26.
In an overall sense the inductive variable indicates
the military does not support the nuclear deterrence strategy
of Controlled Flexible Response. VAR654 says that the mili-
tary does support the null hypothesis. Is this conclusion
valid over the full range of respondent descriptives? Tables
4-8, 4-9 and 4-10 profile the crosstabulation of VAR654 with
the five descriptive categories.
The crosstabulation of VAR654 with respondents rank (Table
4-8) results in a relatively even distribution ranging from
70.0 percent for LT/CPT to 81.6 percent for CAPT/COL . The
service by VAR654 crosstabulation profile (Table 4-8) shows
the Army, Air Force, and Marines scoring 70 percent or more
in the cutoff range. Navy respondents in the cutoff range





Crosstabulation of the respondents Warfare Specialty
(Table 4-9) revealed that the strongest support for Ho
comes from those warfare specialties which are predominantly
Army. Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery scored 80 per-
cent or more. Warfare Specialties containing most of the
Navy and Air Force respondents, Tactical Air, Strategic Air
Command, and Surface Warfare Officers, all scored less than
70 percent.
Breaking down the respondents by source (Table 4-10) the
Navy War College (NWC) respondents scored 58.6 percent.
Defense Language Institute (DLI) and Army War College (AWC)
respondents both scored over 70 percent.
The age crosstabulation (Table 4-10) shows three cate-
gories, 26-34, 35-39, and 45-47 all below 70 percent. How-
ever, the 40-44 category had a large majority of the respon-
dents and scored 76.1 percent. This pulled the average up
to 72.1 percent.
The inductive reduction of the survey results' in a
rather strong sense of support for the null hypothesis,
i.e., the military does not support CFR. This conclusion
is rather uniformly distributed over the five respondent
descriptives . Some areas of weak deviation from the norm are
respondents who are:
1. Navy
2. SWO, TAC AIR, or SAC Warfare Specialties
3. Surveyed at the Navy War College
4. Younger than 40 or older than 44
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B. ANALYSIS OF THE DEDUCTIVE APPROACH
1. VAR111
VAR111 (PRO MAD) is a deductive grouping of nine
primary variables which the author reasons indicate a prefer-
ence for Assured Destruction over Controlled Flexible Response
for a nuclear deterrence strategy.
VARlll has a possible response scale of 9 to 18. 86.6
percent of the respondents scored in the upper half of the
range which indicates support for MAD. 78.6 percent scored
15 or higher (Table 4-4) . Support for MAD is regarded as
supporting the null hypothesis.
The crosstabulation of respondent descriptives with
VARlll uniformly supports the conclusion that the military
prefers a massive retaliation strategy. Ail respondent





2. VAR2 2 2
VAR222 (CFR DESTAB) is a deductive aggregation of
three primary variables which intends to indicate agreement
with the criticism of CFR which says that CFR is somehow
destabilizing or induces a lowering of the tolerance to use
nuclear weapons, sometimes referred to as the nuclear thres-
hold. A high score indicates agreement with the criticism
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and is another support for Ho. The scale of response
ranges from 3 to 6
. 72.9 percent of the respondents scored
5 or 6 (Table 4-5)
.
The respondents therefore support the
criticism that CFR is destabilizing and lowers the nuclear
threshold.
All categories of respondent descriptives scored 70







The conclusion is thus well supported across the whole
range of respondent descriptives.
3. VAR3 33
VAR333 (EQUAL AGGS) is a deductive aggregation of
three primary variables which indicates the military's support
for the philosophy of 'equal aggregates'. The scale of responses
ranges from 3 to 6 with higher scores indicating acceptance of
the 'equal aggregates' concept. Acceptance of this concept,
a basic tenant of Secretary Schlesinger ' s deterrence philoso-
phy, is taken as non-support for Ho. Therefore, scores of
3 and 4 are tabulated in Tables 4-8 through 4-10 as support
for Ho. Overall 21.4 percent of the respondents scored 3
or 4 (Table 4-6)
.
Crosstabulation of VAR333 by the respondent descrip-
tives shows all categories scoring below 30 percent except
the Warfare Specialties of Field Artillery and Surface Warfare
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Officer. Support for Ho, as indicated by VAR333 is thus
very low among the respondents.
4. VAR44 4
VAR444 (PRO CFR) is an aggregation of 14 primary
variables which seeks to indicate the amount of agreement
the respondents have with a wide range of aspects of the
deterrence strategy of Controlled Flexible Response as it
has been espoused by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger.
VAR4 44 is a deductive attempt at forming a general pro or
con CFR indicator. VAR654 is an inductive mirror of VAR444.
Table 4-12 shows that both VAR654 and VAR444 are created
from essentially the same primary variables with only three
differences. VAR444 has a response scale of from 14 to
28 with low scores indicating support of Ho (i.e., high
score supports CFR). 89.9 percent of the respondents scored
20 or less (Table 4-9) . VAR444 thus solidly indicates
support for Ho.
The crosstabula'tion of VAR444 with the respondent
descriptives uniformly supports the conclusion that VAR4 4 4
supports Ho over the range of respondent descriptives. No




C. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS
















654 111 222 333 444
Aggregate Variables
The null hypothesis, that the military does not support
the nuclear deterrence strategy of CFR, is supported by four
of the five aggregate variables. Figure 5-1 summarizes the
percent of respondents scoring in the cutoff range (i.e.,
support for Ho) for each of the aggregate variables. Only
VAR333, 'equal aggregates', does not support Ho.
The response pattern over the five descriptive categories
is quite free of major deviations. The Navy demonstrates
some minor deviations from the general consensus.

With the same clear cut convicti.cn with which the respon-
dents reject the strategy of CFR and certain of its tenets,
they accept the premise of equal aggregates. This could be
an expression of the oft accused military inclination to
support anything which will bring them new weapons and/or
additional funds. The strong reversal of the respondents
concerning VAR33 3 might then be viewed as the dominance of
self serving interests over the national interest. Does the
temptation to garner a bigger piece of the budget dollar
impact a military person's judgment regardless of other
factors? Attempting an answer to this question far exceeds
the bounds of this paper.
Another facet of the data results is the rather decisive
stance evidenced by the respondents , Very few of the primary
variables and none of the aggregate variables evidence ambi-
valence. The responses are strongly grouped. This grouping
is supported across the respondent descriptives
.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The clear conclusion to be drawn from this survey is
that the United States Military does not support the nuclear
deterrence strategy of Controlled Flexible Response. This
survey is, to the best of the author's knowledge, the first
attempt to answer this question. Given that the sample size
is not large, some critics may claim that the conclusions
are superficial and not well grounded. In any case, the
statistical results cannot be intuitively denied. The
conclusions must be accepted until proven false.
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A substantive contribution of this effort is the estab-
lishment of a methodology to quantitatively measure the
values and perceptions of the military community concerning
sensitive issues on which the military's positions carries
significant importance. The preservation of anonymity is
of the utmost importance in obtaining results free from
contamination. Accepted statistical procedures applied to
carefully collected data avoids the normative tendencies
which appear in some studies. The methodology employed in
this study could provide answers to questions which could
or should be important considerations in the formulating of
policies which rely on the military for their successful
implementation
.
Vis-a-vis other civilian-military differences on military
strategy, most recently Viet Nam, the question inevitably
arises as to whether CFR is the 'best' or 'proper' strategy.
What are the nuances of a difference of opinion between
civilian and military leadership of the United States on
fundamental questions of nuclear deterrence strategy? Also
to be asked is how does the shift from MAD to CFR appear to
the Soviets?
What of the 'national debate' Secretary Schlesinger hoped
to spark on the question of deterrence strategies? Did the
debate die under the weight of Watergate, inflation or
recession? Or perhaps this was but a gesture intended to
convey some signal to the Soviets. Senator Proxmire clearly
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warned that the words of Secretary Schlesinger should be
read from that vantage. To quote Senator Proxmire , "We must
be aware that many statements are meant for Soviet ears and
as stage setters for the SALT II negotiations. There is more
psychology here than meets the eye." (58:21)
The challenge to debate stirred no outburst of criticism
or support from the U.S. military community. The author
knows of no compelling reason for this apparent apathy other
than the traditional reserve of the military to refrain from
criticism of its civilian leaders. Does this restraint
extend to supportive statements also?
Peter Ognibene, writing in The New Republic on 24 Feb-
ruary, 1974 lucidly links this 'national debate' to the game
of advertising bargain chips for use in negotiations with
the Soviets. The possibility that the shift to a CFR strategy
might have been more of a signal than a reality does not
denegrate the importance of this study nor diminish the
importance of verifying these conclusions.
The Soviet view of the announced shift in U.S. strategy
must be considered. There is an old and continuing struggle
within the Kremlin between conservatives (Hawks) and prag-
matists (Doves). The pragmatists' argument is clearly
represented by the following quote:
.... there is no more dangerous illusion
than the idea that thermonuclear war can
still serve as an instrument of politics;
that it is possible to achieve political
aims through the use of nuclear power, and
at the same time survive; and that it is




This is a direct rejection of any notion of limited
nuclear war being an element of Soviet foreign policy. The
present Soviet regime is acknowledged to be dominated by
pragmatists. Most recently (after President Ford's Vladavis-
tok meetings) the official journal KOMMUNIST editorialized
on the results of even low level conflict between the U.S.
and the USSR. It said, concerning the effects of a military
conflict between the USSR and the United States, ".... a
conflict which would be equivalent to the launching of a
world nuclear missile war." (55)
The conservatives assert, ".... that a nuclear war does
not necessarily pose 'a threat to physical survival of nations
and states' and that it is very important to impress upon
the Soviet people 'the possibilities of conducting a
victorious nuclear missile war'.. (30:46)
One might also postulate that this strategy shift by
the U.S. is an exercise in linkage politics. It might be
an effort by the U.S. Department of Defense to communicate
some message to the Soviet Ministry of Defense concerning
the limits of certain strategic capabilities.
If none of these possibilities applies, how then must
the Soviet pragmatists who hold power in the Kremlin now
view a U.S. move which many recognize to be a move towards
a nuclear war fighting capability? (59) Particularly in
light of their denial of any form of nuclear war as a viable
policy tool and their view that a U.S. - USSR military con-
flict will result in launching a 'world nuclear missile war'
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Victor Zorza wrote in the Washington" Post concerning the
internal debate within the Kremlin on the 'fundamental'
struggle between the pragmatist, General Secretary Brezhnev,
and the Hawk, Defense Minister Grechko. He said, "The Krem-
lin's policy, and with it the future of detente, will be
determined by the way this 'fundamental' disagreement is
resolved, in Moscow, and how the two capitals (US/USSR)
interact." (62)
These are momentous questions of great importance to
national and world survival. The effects of our actions and
the statements of respected government officials on questions
of deterrence strategy must be evaluated for their impact on
the U.S. citizen and the government of the Soviet Union.
The results of this survey and the discussions included
in this report open numerous questions worthy of further
investigation. Already mentioned are possible investigations
which might be conducted into the comparative merits of MAD
and CFR in today's weapons environment, taking into account
of what is known of Soviet strategy. Also the question of
the implications of a divergence between military and civilian
leadership on the question of deterrence strategies has been
mentioned. A further area for scholarly endeavor would be the
whole subject of gestures, their intent and their results.
The significant import of this paper is the establish-
ment of a major difference of philosophy on nuclear deterrence
strategy between our country's civilian leadership, personified
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by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, and a defined sampling
of middle to upper middle level career military officers.
The impact of this strategy shift and its significance in
various areas will be left to other learned researchers.
On a national level, serious thought must be given to both
sides of the disagreement. National resolve in a nuclear
crisis can only be weakened if the strategies to be followed
are only 'accepted' and not fully and faithfully agreed upon




DETERRENCE FORCES OF THE U.S. AND THE USSR
The calculus of deterrence force has reached such a high
state today that no one can agree on the units of measure
or how to total these units for comparative purposes.
There are three primary measures of nuclear deterrence
force:
1. The number of launch vehicles
2
.
The number of reentry vehicles
3. The total deliverable megatonnage
It is argued that other factors have a significant
influence on the calculus of deterrence force; however, for
the most part these are not discussed in open literature due
to security classifications. These technological factors
include total lift capability, accuracy, system reliability,
penetration aids, certain warhead technology, and MIRV and
MARV (MIRV-Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles;
MARV - MAneuverable Reentry Vehicle)
.
All figures presented here are taken either directly
from sources 8, 33, or 53 or they result from calculations
made by the author using figures from one or more of these




Number of Number of Deliverable
US ICBM Launch Vehicles Warheads Megatonnage
Titan II 54 54 270
Minuteman II 500 500 1,000
Minuteman III 500 1,500 300
1 ,054 2,054 1,570
USSR ICBM
SS-7/SS-8 209 209 1,045




























B-52 (C-F) 262 1,048 1,048














Thus, the total figures for the three most publicized





The US ICBM force is fixed at 1,054 launchers. The 54
Tital II launchers will likely be phased out in favor of
SLBMs. The Minuteman mix of 500 MM II 's and 500 MM Ill's
could be changed in favor of more MM Ill's increasing the
number of warheads (MM III are MIRV, 3 warheads) but reducing
the deliverable megatonnage (MM II - 1 meg, MM III - 2 00 KT)
.
There are no plans to build additional US ICBMs
.
The US is improving its SLBM force both quantitatively
and qualitatively. The 31 Poseidon submarines will be back-
filled with the Trident missile (C-4) providing extended
range (4,500 NM) and improved accuracy. The force is planned
to be augmented by a minimum of 10 Trident submarines carrying
24 missiles (C-4) each. The Trident will eventually be fitted
with the D-5 missile with a range in excess of 6,000 NM.
Thus in the SLBM area the US is in the process of increasing
the number of launch vehicles, warheads, and deliverable
megatonnage as well as improving other qualitative items.
The US bomber picture is less clear. Almost yearly the
US Air Force attempts to get funding for a new bomber to
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replace the B-52. To date they have been unsuccessful.
Therefore, for the foreseeable future (at least till tomor-
row) no significant shift of the US bomber posture is
envisioned.
In summary, by the early 1980s the US will likely alter
its strategic forces as follows:
ICBMs - convert all
1000 to MM III
SLBMs - 31 Poseidon
(C-4) , 10 Polaris
(A- 3) , 10 Trident
(C-4)
BOMBERS - 255 E-52
(G-H) , 71 FB111














To project the Soviet force structure is risky at best
However, the author feels the most likely Soviet force
changes will be:
1) Qualitative improvement of ICBMs including MIRV,
increased accuracy, and reliability.
2) Deployment of at least 63 modern SLBMs of the
Yankee and Delta classes with longer ranges and
MIRV capabilities.
Based on these projected changes the scorecard for the












No attempt will be made to interpret the meaning of
these indicators. The point here is to provide the reader
with some basis for evaluating other literature which may
use one or more of these indicators as a measure of strate-
gic power. It is hoped that some appreciation of the vagaries
of such an exercise are apparent and the reader will have









You are invited to participate in a research investiga-
tion the object of which is to profile the values and percep-
tions concerning nuclear deterrence strategies. The population
to be surveyed is a select group of military persons many
of whom will be commanding our operational forces in the
near future.
Similar surveys have been conducted by academics, however
the population surveyed has been limited to other academics
or politicians. This survey is an attempt to get the mili-
tary's viewpoint on a subject currently in a state of flux
while the subject is still in the conceptual phase.
In answering the questions please do so within the
framework of the given capabilities and strike definitions.
STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES
All questions assume that nations A and B possess the
following capabilities:
1. First a strike capability to completely destroy the social
and industrial fabric of the other nation including greater
than 50% fatalities.
2. First strike capability against opposing land based
strategic forces capable of destroying a minimum of 70%
of the opposition's land based delivery capability.
3. Second strike capability (primarily SLBMs) to destroy
greater than 50% of the oppositions industrial capacity
and inflict 50% casualties.
NUCLEAR STRIKE DEFINITIONS
1. Full First Strike-All out strike against military, induS'
trial, and population centers. Minimal restrike capability
remains. Second strike forces still remain.
2. Limited First Strike-Strike at primarily land based
strategic forces. Major portion of first strike and full
second strike capabilities remain.
3. Controlled Response-Selected targeting in which targets
are attacked in a graduated sequence. Targets include any
remaining land based strategic assets, other military,
industrial, transportation, and communications targets.
Population centers are not primary targets.
4. Massive Retaliation-Full utilization of any available
land based strike forces as well as the bulk of the second


























1. Limited strike by A.
2. Massive retaliation by B
1. Limited strike by A.
2. Massive retaliation by B.
3. Massive second strike by A
1. Limited strike by A.
2. Controlled response by B.
1. Massive first strike by A.
2. through n. Controlled response
by B.
1. Massive first strike by A.




1. RANK (0-6, GS17 etc)
2. SERVICE (or government dept)
3. WARFARE SPECIALTY (infantry, subs, sac, etc)
4. PRESENT DUTY STATION
5. AGE
STRATEGIC VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS
6. B's reaction to A's limited strike in Scenario I is
likely to deter such a strike by A.
YES( ) NO( )
7. Scenario I almost certainly leads to Scenario II.
YES( ) NO( )
8. The exchange depicted in Scenario II will deter A from
initiating such an exchange.
YES( ) NO( )
9. Scenario V is the most probable format for any future
exchange as long as A and B are of comparable strength,
YES ( ) NO ( )
10. B's best strategy to deter a limited first strike by
A is Scenario I or Scenario III.
I ( . ) I.IK )
11. The deployment of a 100% effective counterforce capability
against land based strategic forces by A or B would
significantly alter the strategic balance.
YES( ) NO( )
12. The espousal by B of the strategy depicted in Scenario III:
a. increases indernational stability
b. decreases international stability
a. ( ) b.( )
13. The aftermath of Scenario V assures its non-occurance
YES( ) NO( )
14. The deployment of an apparently effective counterforce
capability by either party forces a like deployment by
the other.
YES ( ) NO ( )
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15. Assuming that B possess no other reaction capability
than that depicted in Scenario I and B knew for certain
that the result of his reaction in Scenario I will be
Scenario II his rational options to a limited strike
by A include no response.
YES( ) N0( )
16. The assumed position of B in the preceeding question
reduces A's perception of the nuclear threshold.
YES( ) N0( )
17. Scenario III will probably result in continued probes
and responses by both sides.
YES( ) N0( )
18. The response of B in Scenario V is a stronger deterrent
to a massive attack by A than B's response in Scenario IV,
YES( ) N0( )
19. B's best strategy to deter a limited strike by A is:
a. Response in kind.
b. Response at some multiple of A's strike.
c. All out attack upon A.
a.( ) b.( ) c.( )
20. First strike calculations become feasible when the
capability exists to limit one's fatalities to less
than % .
21. A credible deterrent should ensure enemy fatalities of
at least %.
22. The best strategy to deter a limited first strike against
one's strategic forces is:
a. Instant Massive Retaliation.
b. Selected controlled response.
a. ( ) b.( )
23. The possession of sufficient survivable second strike
forces neutralizes the effect of an enemies deployment
of an effective anti-land based ICBM counter force
capability and argues against the necessity to deploy
a like capability.
YES( ) NO( )
24. If the limited strike by A in Scenario II were not
responded to more limited strikes would follow.
YES( ) NO( )
25. A shift in deterrence strategy from massive retaliation
to controlled response increases the likelihood of a
nuclear exchange.
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